NEWS
The reasonableness of COVID-19 vaccine booster hesitancy
August 26th 2026
My paper "The reasonableness of COVID-19 vaccine booser hesitancy" was published by Routledge in The Ethics and Epistemology of Vaccine Hesitancy, edited by Sven Bernecker and Tom Sorell.
In the paper, I examine the reasonableness of COVID-19 booster hesitancy among the vaccinated. I argued that hesitancy is reasonable on three grounds. First, the initial rollout took place in a public emergency, whereas boosters are rolled out in a non-emergency situation. Public emergencies create special overriding considerations that make most vaccine hesitancy unreasonable, but those considerations do not arise in non-emergencies. Second, the justification of annual boosters is precautionary rather than to do with an emergency, and precautionary justification is disputable given that there are reasonable alternative mitigation strategies. Third, the expected contribution in receiving boosters is burdensome for some groups, such as young people, and especially young males.
You can read my paper here.
A rapid evidence review of evaluation techniques for large language models in legal use cases: trends, gaps, and recommendations for future research
24th November 2025
My co-authored article, "A rapid evidence review of evaluation techniques for large language models in legal use cases: trends, gaps, and recommendations for future research", has just been published in AI and Society.
The paper highlights shortcomings in the ways that large language models are evaluated in the context of legal use cases. It argues that evaluation metrics are often insensitive to the application domains, and suggests ways to improve evaluation in the future.
You can read my paper here.
Against Moral-Aesthetic Prescriptivism: Rejecting the Foundations of the Moralism Versus Immoralism Debate
30th June 2025
My article, "Against Moral-Aesthetic Prescriptivism: Rejecting the Foundations of the Moralism Versus Immoralism Debate", has just been published in The British Journal of Aesthetics.
The paper challenges the widely held assumption that artworks prescribe moral or immoral attitudes to their audiences, and that audiences are required to adopt these attitudes to engage with the work properly. I argue that this foundation is mistaken, and that many artworks prompt moral exploration rather than prescription.
This has implications for how we understand the relationship between morality and aesthetic value in art.
You can read my paper here.